Research

"No War, Yet No Peace: How States and Rebel Groups Coexist" (Book Project)

In many parts of the world, states do not exercise full authority over their territory or maintain a monopoly on violence. Instead, armed groups often persist alongside central governments, wielding varying degrees of domestic authority. My book project investigates when and how states and rebel groups coexist in this gray zone between civil war and formal peace. Building on literatures on authoritarian powersharing and co-optation, I develop a theory of informal armed coexistence that explains how regimes and rebels negotiate de facto arrangements, dividing territorial and functional authority in ways ranging from hostile toleration to strategic coordination.

To capture this variation, I introduce a novel typology and original dataset of rebel–state relations across the MENA region (1960–2020), providing a conceptual and empirical framework for understanding informal political order. Using a nested research design, the project combines cross-national and within-country statistical analysis with process tracing. A case study of Iraqi–Kurdish relations, based on extensive archival research, illuminates the causal mechanisms that shape actors’ choice between civil conflict, coexistence, and peace.

This project contributes to debates on civil war termination, hybrid governance, and authoritarian survival by showing how informal powersharing can emerge and persist without formal settlements. It speaks to broader questions of when governments seek to eliminate armed challengers, when they tolerate or appease them, and how divided sovereignty can serve as a durable tool of authoritarian violence management. The dataset also fills a critical gap in existing civil conflict data by capturing rebel–state interactions during periods that are often treated as missing or inactive. It complements existing conflict event data by documenting the nature of rebel–state relations during non-war years, offering a richer picture of armed politics in contested states.

Under Review

"Know Thyself: Rebel Leader Experience and Bargaining Behavior" with Juliana Tappe-Ortiz.

Why are some rebel leaders more effective negotiators than others? While some peace processes settle rapidly, others drag on for years making peace harder to achieve as conflicts and negotiations mature. Newly available data allows us to assess the effect of rebel leaders’ characteristics on negotiation dynamics and duration. We argue that combat experience of rebel leaders results in shorter negotiations as leaders better understand their group’s capabilities, and thus converge on mutually acceptable terms more quickly. We also show that combat experience mitigates how rebels bring their capabilities to bear in negotiations. We test our theory on a dataset of over 10,000 negotiation-months covering peace processes across 63 countries and territories between 1975 and 2013. Estimating cause-specific hazard models, we find that rebel leaders’ combat experience significantly decreases negotiation duration. Rebel leaders with combat experience achieve peace more rapidly regardless of their group’s relative capabilities. We contribute to a growing literature on rebel leader characteristics and shed light on previously understudied aspects of rebel behavior in civil war negotiations. Our findings contribute to the continuing debate about how and when leaders matter. Overall, this study advances an empirical research agenda focused on the role of rebel leaders in conflict processes and their negotiation behavior in particular.

Working Papers

"Coexisting with Threats: Informal Governance Arrangements in the Face of Foreign Subversion."

How do states respond to foreign efforts to subvert their domestic authority? The presence of armed non-state actors allows foreign governments to engage these as proxies and further destabilize or distract governments of weak states. While the elimination, demobilization, or integration of armed actors may remove opportunities for external states to use armed groups as proxy forces, these strategies are difficult to achieve. I posit, states use a strategy of limited appeasement resulting in informal coexistence with domestic armed groups removing external state’s ability to undermine domestic authority through local armed challengers. The threat from foreign subversion facilitates demand for informal armed power-sharing. In turn, allowing states and armed groups to coexist. To test my theory, I estimate logistic and non-parametric survival models on a large-n dataset of 365 rebel-state dyads across the Middle East and North Africa region between 1970-2012. I find the risk of foreign meddling results in informal power-sharing that can constitute lasting coexistence. This study contributes to our understanding of how states can engage with and manage the persistence of armed nonstate actors, as well as the durability of informal peace and governance arrangements.

"Fade Away: Persistent Stalemates and the Durability of Informal Peace after Civil War."

Why do some civil war stalemates result in lasting informal peace? Existing research suggests that decisive victories or negotiated settlements in civil conflict provide greater chances for lasting peace. Yet, most civil conflicts “fade out” rather than conclude formally. We have limited understanding of the conditions that make certain actors more likely to cease violence rather than fight to the bitter end. I argue that conflicts that fade out can mark the beginning of persistent stalemates in which state and nonstate actors settle into lasting coexistence with low levels of hostilities. Using data on conflict episodes between 1970 and 2018, I show that persistent stalemates are neither more violent nor less stable than other forms of conflict termination. Estimating survival and competitive risk models, I find that the character of actors’ war aims, and the nature of post-war institutions shape the probability that informal peace lasts. This research advances our understanding of the conditions that make such informal peace last. More research is necessary to explore the arrangements that emerge where state and nonstate actors persist side-by-side without formal peace agreements.

"When Rebels Turn Pro-Government: Explaining Rebel-State Cooperation During Multi-Party Conflict."

When do rebels switch sides and align with the government during multiparty conflict? Today’s conflicts are increasingly characterized by a multiplicity of actors on both sides of a dispute. While much attention has been given to rebel side-switching across rebel alliances, the conditions for rebel side-switching to the government side remain understudied. Existing arguments focus only on groups’ willingness and capacity to side-switch and ignore governments’ incentives to accept the alliance. I argue that side-switching is most likely where the alliance offers both actors opportunities for outbidding, high expected benefits from removal of competitors, or alleviation of conflict intensity. Using Firth regression and rare events simulation on a dataset of deliberate alignment shifts during civil wars between 1989 and 2007, I find robust support for my argument. Armed groups’ resource and survival concerns alone matter little where governments benefit from intergroup competition and infighting. Expected mutual benefit rather than unilateral need is a strong predictor for rebel pro-government side-switching.

Works in Progress

"(Re)Conceptualizing International Intervention with Consent and Reform" with Aila Matanock.
"Avoiding the Coup-Proofing Dilemma Through Invited Interventions" with Aila Matanock and Andrew Wojtanik.
"How Weak States Govern Via Aid Networks" with Susanna Campbell and Cecilia Cavero Sanchez.
"Peacekeeping Deployment and the Displacement of Violence."
"Targeting the Motivated: How Autocracies Deter Terrorism"
"Anonymous Terrorism Beyond Credit Claiming Behavior."
"Dangerous Conditions: Right-Wing Parties and Domestic Terrorism" with Jesus Rojas Venzor.